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I.  Introduction 
 
 Prior to 1900, transplants of bodily matter had already begun in the form of blood 
transfusions.
1
  Shortly thereafter in 1905, the first cornea transplant was accomplished.
2
  
However, the first successful organ transplant is said to have taken place on December 23, 1954 
in Boston, Massachusetts.
3
  Richard Herrick, who was only 23 at the time, received a kidney 
from his identical twin brother, Ronald, and went on to live for another eight years.
4
  Ever since 
this time, and perhaps even earlier, human beings have held potentially great value in the organs 
that compose their bodies.  As organ transplants became more common, this value presumably 
rose.  This would become especially true once donors outside of the patient’s immediate kin 
were factored into the equation.   
 The organ commodification debate has been at the forefront of bioethical thought ever 
since.  Naturally, there are many arguments to be made against legalizing the sale of human 
organs.  To some the ramification from someone “purchasing life” through buying a requisite 
organ is morally reprehensible.
5
  Fears would abound that the poor would be taken advantage of 
by the rich, selling their organs in an attempt to escape their downtrodden economic situation.
6
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All the while, these poor donors would have little to no concept of the consequences of such a 
decision to sell.
7
  In fact, they may even become a drain on the U.S. healthcare system later on 
due to complications from such transactions.
8
   
 Of course, this only represents one side of the often heated debate.  Thousands upon 
thousands of people remain on organ transplant waiting lists in the U.S. without a successful 
match.  For instance, almost 83,000 Americans are on the national waiting list for kidneys alone 
and roughly 13 of them will die each day.
9
  This total has increased almost a third since just the 
end of 2005 when 65,000 was the estimated total.
10
  In effect, prohibiting compensation for 
organs is lessening the chances of survival for these waitlisted patients and often hastening their 
death by hindering supply.  Nevertheless, Congress fell to the former side of this debate and 
subsequently enacted legislation.   
 Since Congress’ decision, time has shown that an altruistic system for organ donation has 
not been successful.  Change is needed before the gap between those on waiting lists and the 
available number of organs grows even larger than it already has.  Compensation for organ 
donation should be legalized in the United States.  Some of the deeply held fears regarding such 
a decision are no longer relevant.  In addition, more lives will be saved with compensation 
increasing the supply of organs than are without. 
 When Congress chose to address this issue almost thirty years ago, the state of organ 
transplantation was markedly different.  Now organ recipients live longer and quality of life 
post-transplant has improved.  Nevertheless, the number of those in need grows larger as supply 
lags behind.  A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit has somewhat blurred the lines further 
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between compensating certain portions of the body and not doing so with others.  It has 
advanced questions of fundamental fairness for those afflicted with diseases of prohibited body 
parts.  This judicial decision reinvigorated the debate and has brought it into a more modern 
context. 
 Several elements and theories of bioethical analysis lend support to organ 
commodification.  Some of these theories have been developed recently, well after the statutory 
ban on compensation.  Whether individually or societal based, these theories suggest that 
compensation for organs is the better way to lean in this debate. 
 Other countries, such as Iran, have experimented far more than the United States has in 
the past few decades by offering various forms of compensation.  In general, they have seen 
substantial success in increasing the available supply of organs in their countries.  These policies 
often involve offering compensation well beyond just the cost of the particular procedure.  
Furthermore, these programs have had other positive by-products such as lessening transplant 
tourism and stemming the spread of disease.   
 Adopting a similar approach in the United States would provide comparable results.  
Supply of organs would be increased and more matches found.  Analogous derivatives would be 
seen in curtailing transplant tourism.  Not only would legalizing compensation for organs help to 
halt any domestic underground market, but it would also likely put a dent in the international 
black market where American citizens are generally thought to make up a large portion of the 
clientele.             
II. Statutory and Judicial Responses to the Organ Commodification Debate 
 A. National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 (“NOTA”) 
4 
 
 
 In 1984, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplantation Act (“NOTA”).11  NOTA 
itself explicitly prohibited the sale/purchase of human organs.  The statute defined “human 
organ” as any human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, 
eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, 
including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by 
regulation.
12
  This issue was addressed statutorily in 1984 specifically for several reasons.     
 NOTA began with the intentions that life-saving organs should never have to be 
purchased and they should be a “gift” to the recipient.13  Other reasons for addressing the issue 
then included increased media attention of individuals’ plights to obtain organ transplants, which 
they were having great difficulty achieving.
14
  Moreover, improvements in surgical techniques 
and the development of immunosuppressant drugs led to the statute’s enactment.15  From the 
Senate report, it is clear that Congress was perhaps most concerned with the distributive justice 
element of organ transplants.  This was demonstrated in the plain text when it stated, “The 
Committee believes that individual pleas through television and newspaper articles, while 
commendable in bringing to public attention the urgent circumstance of one person’s need, may 
be counterproductive to the needs of many others requiring organ transplantation.”16  Congress 
felt that allocation would be fairer through donor registries and waiting lists.   
 As Representative Waxman stated during the time of enactment, “If [people are allowed 
to sell their kidneys], I believe our efforts to promote voluntary organ donations would collapse, 
and health risks to transplant patients would greatly increase.  Human organs should not be 
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treated like fenders in an auto junkyard.”17  Waxman’s statement made the assumption that 
voluntary organ donations would suffice to combat the problem of insufficient supply.  
Unfortunately, this was not proven true as the problem has only increased over time, in spite of 
increased surgical technology.  This debate was recently brought to the forefront once more 
within the specific context of bone marrow transplants.   
 B. Flynn v. Holder and the Legalization of Certain Bone Marrow Transplants 
  1. The Difficulty in Matching Bone Marrow 
 In April 2010, Kumud Majumder lost his son and only child, Arya, to leukemia.
18
  Arya, 
whom Kumud described as “an angel who transformed my life” was only eleven years old when 
he passed.
19
  His death was in part hastened by the inability to find a bone marrow match for 
transplant.  Unfortunately, stories resembling Kumud’s are far too commonplace.  In excess of 
100,000 Americans are diagnosed annually with serious blood and bone marrow disorders.
20
  
Many of these individuals require a transplant of bone marrow cells to combat their particular 
malady.   
 Finding matches for bone marrow recipients is an often difficult proposition because 
there are various types of proteins present on bone marrow stem cells.  Family members 
generally offer the best probability for a match, but even then the estimated success rate of 30% 
is paltry at best.
21
  The difficulty in matching blood stem cells has led to striking statistics for 
those in need.  Of those 100,000 Americans, roughly 40,500 are adults who will be diagnosed 
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specifically with leukemia.
22
  In addition, another 3,500 children will share the same fate.
23
  
Between 2,000 and 3,000 Americans die every year from a failure to achieve a suitable bone 
marrow match for their blood-based illness.
24
  
 Statistics also illustrate varying success rates for people of different racial groups.  Those 
of mixed-race parentage and African-American descent tend to possess a mix of African, 
Caucasian, and Native American genes, making matches even rarer.
25
  Consequently, Caucasian 
patients are successfully matched roughly 70% of the time.
26
  Meanwhile, this number drops to 
only about 40% for those Americans of African descent.
27
  The numbers inarguably point to a 
decreased chance of finding a match for African-Americans and those individuals of mixed-race 
parentage.  A potentially effective means of combating these numbers is to increase the potential 
number of donors by offering some form of compensation.  However, until the Flynn v. Holder 
decision came down, compensation for all forms of bone marrow transplant were thought to be 
prohibited by NOTA.
28
   
  2. Compensation is Legal under the Apheresis Method 
 On December 1, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit handed down its 
decision in Flynn v. Holder that compensation for bone marrow stem cells derived from the 
“peripheral blood stem cell apheresis method” (“apheresis”) was legal.29  Additionally, the Court 
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held that compensation was still prohibited for donation of bone marrow through the more 
antiquated method of aspiration.
30
   
 The two methods of donation contain substantial differences and these contained the 
distinctions the Court used in arriving at its ruling.  The Court described aspiration as a “painful, 
unpleasant procedure” in which thick needles were inserted into the cavities of the anesthetized 
donor’s bones in order to extract the soft, fatty substance from within commonly known as bone 
marrow.
31
  This was the procedure for bone marrow donation in place when Congress enacted 
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).
32
  However, the newer method of apheresis has 
been developed since.  Under the apheresis method, the donor is first injected for five days with 
“granulocyte colony-stimulating factor” medication prior to the actual procedure, which 
increases the amount of blood stem cells that exit from the marrow and enter into the 
bloodstream.
33
  Afterwards, a needle for collection is placed into the donor’s vein.34  The donor’s 
blood is subsequently run through an apheresis machine.  The machine separates out the blood 
stem cells.  The remaining blood is then injected back into the donor.  The stem cells taken from 
the donor will be replaced naturally by his/her body within three to six weeks.
35
  The apheresis 
method of extraction is more common presently, being used in about two-thirds of all donations 
(the remaining third still coming through the aspiration method).
36
   
 On its face, NOTA prohibits any compensation for bone marrow.
37
  However, the Ninth 
Circuit did not believe that the statute was applicable to the apheresis method of bone marrow 
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donation because the Court likened the apheresis method to an ordinary blood donation.
38
  Blood 
and its derivatives were specifically intended not to fall under NOTA’s scope.39  As the Court 
pointed out, the only difference between an ordinary blood donation and a donor undergoing the 
apheresis method is that the latter involves the donor sitting for longer as well as the apheresis 
machine separating stem cells from the blood.
40
  When the apheresis machine is used to sort and 
collect plasma or platelets the procedure is referred to as a “blood donation” or a “blood plasma 
donation.”41  When it is used to separate out blood stem cells, it is commonly known as a “bone 
marrow donation.”42 
  3. The Court’s Distinction 
 The question then remained whether commonly referring to a procedure as a “bone 
marrow donation” actually entailed that bone marrow itself was involved.  Under the apheresis 
method, none of the soft, fatty substance that is extracted through aspiration is present.
43
  Rather, 
the apheresis machine merely separates blood stem cells from the blood that is extracted.
44
  For 
the Court, the critical components were the actual material separated out and the location from 
which the material came.  The donor would be providing his/her blood stem cells, not their bone 
marrow.  Furthermore, these blood stem cells would come from the bloodstream, not from within 
the cavities of the donor’s bones.  If compensating donors for their stem cells through this 
method was banned, the Court reasoned then that all compensated blood donations must be 
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outlawed as well.  Yet, the Senate Report had plainly excluded blood from the language of the 
statute.
45
     
 NOTA provides that the term “human organ” means the human (including fetal) kidney, 
liver, heart, bone marrow…etc. (or any subpart thereof).46  As a result, the government raised the 
issue as to whether the blood stem cells fell under the statutory language of “or any subpart 
thereof” in reference to not just organs in their entirety but any subpart of them as well.47  These 
blood stem cells do after all originate within the bone marrow before naturally moving into the 
bloodstream.  The Court did not find merit in this argument because the theoretical distance 
between actual bone marrow and the bloodstream was simply too great.
48
  Further buttressing the 
Court’s reasoning, the drafters of NOTA could not have had the apheresis in mind because it had 
not yet been developed.
49
  
 Since the decision in December, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declined 
the Obama Administration’s request to reconsider its ruling.50  Consequently, the Administration 
had 90 days from that time to consider petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States.
51
  
Regardless, this is a ruling that should remain and one which the other circuit courts would be 
wise to follow.  The 9
th
 Circuit’s analogy of peripheral blood stem cell apheresis to other blood 
donations appears strong.  Since apheresis does not fall under the scope of NOTA, there is 
nothing to prevent payment for such donations.  It is almost guaranteed that the donor pool for 
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this method of bone marrow donation will increase and thereby lives will be saved by matches 
that would not have occurred beforehand.  
  4. Questions Raised by the Court’s Holding  
 The initial question following the Flynn ruling was what does this mean for those patients 
with afflictions of other organs?  Does this holding offer them any renewed hope of seeing their 
particular donor pools increase?  The short answer is no.  Since the Ninth Circuit found that 
apheresis does not fall under NOTA, the statute was not affected in any manner.  The holding 
was therefore limited strictly to this particular form of bone marrow stem cell donation for 
transplant. 
 Flynn does raise an interesting hypothetical, which concerns fundamental questions of 
fairness involving compensation for organs.  Recipients of any organ transplant currently require 
immunosuppressant medications to prevent their body from attacking the new organ.  However, 
a highly successful, albeit admittedly small Stanford University study, recently challenged this 
prevailing knowledge with kidney recipients.
52
  Patients in the study subsequently received a 
bone marrow transplant from the same donor as their kidney, using the apheresis method.
53
  
They were able to then be removed from these expensive and potentially dangerous 
immunosuppressant medications.
54
  In fact, eight of the twelve patients have been off the 
medications completely since, while the others showed substantial progress.
55
  According to 
Flynn, compensation for the donors’ peripheral blood stem cells would be legal while 
compensation for their kidneys would still be prohibited by NOTA.  The question that then arises 
is why a donor would be allowed to be compensated for one part of an overall process, but 
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prohibited for the other part.  The kidney provides the patient with the chance at extended life.  
However, the bone marrow transplant offers the recipient the ability to forgo medications laden 
with severe side effects and extreme cost.  Immunosuppressant medications generally run 
anywhere between $2,000 and $4,000 per month.
56
   
 Additionally, Flynn raises questions about why patients with certain afflictions may 
benefit from a donor pool increased by compensation while others would not.  If someone were 
unfortunately diagnosed with leukemia, they may now have a better chance of getting the bone 
marrow transplant they need because of compensation being legalized.  On the other hand, if 
someone were diagnosed with kidney disease they would continue to see a largely decreasing 
chance of a match, in part because compensation for their afflicted organ is still banned under 
NOTA.
57
       
 Twenty-eight years after the enactment of NOTA, and in light of the Flynn decision, it 
may be time to once again reassess this prohibition and decide whether it truly offers the best 
solution given the current technology of organ transplantation and state of waiting lists.  It is 
important to weigh out the competing bioethical elements and theories within this context.  
Additionally, while the United States policy on compensation for organ transplants has been 
wholly stagnant for almost three decades, many other countries have been more experimental in 
their approaches to this problem.  Although not necessarily definitive, a look at other countries’ 
potential solutions could provide an idea of what might happen if they were effectuated here.  
The development of a peripheral blood stem cell market under the apheresis method will 
similarly provide a prototype of what a market for other organs may in fact resemble.  
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Undoubtedly, a reassessment of NOTA and the prohibition on compensation is warranted given 
the current state of transplant waiting lists. 
III. Bioethical Analysis of the Organ Commodification Debate 
 Several elements of bioethical analysis find themselves constantly invoked regarding the 
organ commodification debate.  The two most important are autonomy and distributive justice.  
These two elements generally find themselves competing within this context.  Proponents of 
organ compensation use autonomy to support their arguments.  Conversely, opponents of 
compensation lean heavily upon distributive justice in order to support their claims.  It should 
also not be understated that compensation for organ donations finds itself equally supported by 
both societal-based and individually-based bioethical theories.  Utilitarianism has long been the 
bioethical theory most widely used to support organ commodification.  However, newer theories 
of bioethical analysis have developed within the last few decades that also lend support to this 
concept.  These theories include Narrative Bioethics and the Law and Economics theory.  It is 
important to first observe the conflict between the two main competing elements.   
 A. Autonomy vs. Distributive Justice 
 Autonomy is one of the fundamental principles of bioethics and simply represents the 
concept that independent actions and choices of the individual should not be constrained by 
others.
58
  However, distributive justice is also a fundamental bioethics element and runs contrary 
to autonomy.  Distributive justice represents the idea that benefits and burdens ought to be 
distributed equitably, that resources ought to be allocated fairly, and that one ought to act in such 
a manner that no one person or group bears a disproportionate share of benefit or burdens.
59
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When placed into the context of organ compensation, these elements clearly are in conflict.  
Proponents of autonomy would argue that since organs are of one’s own property people should 
be free to do as they please with them, including selling them.  Proponents of a more distributive 
justice based system, as it currently exists, would claim that there needs to be a mechanism in 
place to promote fairness in the process of deciding who gets each available organ.  Presently in 
the U.S., the waiting lists are maintained by the United Network of Organ Sharing (“UNOS”).60  
UNOS possesses the contract to operate the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network 
(“OPTN”).61  The average wait time for a kidney for a U.S. resident varies from anywhere 
between two and ten years.
62
  This all depends upon blood type, antibody level, organ 
availability, among other factors.
63
  If a patient chooses to decline an available matching organ, 
they do not then retain their spot for the next available organ.  In fact, they may endure an even 
further waiting time if this occurs.
64
 
 Since the enactment of NOTA, this distributive justice based model has only seen the 
number of patients increase while supply has lagged further behind.  Although everyone may 
have an equal chance at receiving an organ, too many people are unnecessarily dying while 
waiting.  If an individual has the means to acquire an available organ, they should be able to do 
so.  Introducing compensation would only serve to increase the supply of available organs.  
Those patients who are better off financially would undoubtedly then have an advantage towards 
acquiring the requisite organ.  Nevertheless, more lives would be saved in total than are 
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currently.  This objective of saving more lives as a whole leads directly into an examination of 
utilitarianism.        
 B. Utilitarianism 
 The most important traditional theory for compensation of organs comes in the form of 
utilitarianism.  Utilitarianism essentially provides that the proper act is the one that maximizes 
the aggregate happiness of the whole society.
65
  For those proponents of reform to the current 
U.S. organ transplantation system, utilitarianism often makes up the backbone of their 
arguments.  Clearly, organ transplant waiting lists are only growing in size while supply is 
declining or stagnating.  By legalizing some compensation for organs, the donor pool for each 
would likely grow.  How substantially it might grow is debatable but statistics from other 
countries suggest that compensation would cause the number of donors to increase greatly.
66
  
The tradeoff under the utilitarian view would be those in society who would be harmed from 
compensation for organs being legalized.  Generally, this is thought to be the exceptionally poor 
who would donate while not receiving adequate compensation for their efforts.  Examples of this 
are also prevalent in other countries.   
 However, this focuses largely on the two extremes.  It is the middle ground under which 
utilitarianism theory would shift the balance in favor of legalizing organ compensation.  The 
middle ground is composed of those individuals who are not exceptionally poor and have some 
altruistic motivations.  Nevertheless, altruism alone may not be enough by itself to inspire them 
to donate.  The addition of compensation into the equation subsequently shifts them from not 
donating towards donating.  This class of donors would receive their compensation while also 
receiving an altruistic benefit.  In turn, the recipient of their organ would get the gift of extended 
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life.  In this simplistic analysis, utilitarian theory appears to show that compensation for organs 
would increase the aggregate happiness of the whole society in comparison to the current state of 
affairs. 
 C. More Recently Developed Theories of Bioethical Analysis 
 Just as the organ commodification debate is constantly evolving so too are the bioethical 
approaches towards such issues.  Critics of more traditional principle-based ethical analyses have 
argued that not everything should be parsed into oft-used bioethical elements, such as autonomy, 
distributive justice, and beneficence.
67
  Several new theories have arisen within the last decade, 
which offer interesting perspectives on this dilemma.  A few of them are worth a cursory glance 
in order to get a general idea of how this debate may sit within their particular frameworks.   
  1. Narrative Bioethics 
 The first relevant new theory is that of narrative bioethics.  Narrative bioethics suggests 
that a great deal can be learned from the stories of those involved in bioethical matters.
68
  The 
argument is that if those involved are able to tell their personalized stories, the proper ending to 
those stories will become readily apparent.
69
  One obvious example has already been addressed 
in the context of the Flynn case.  Upon hearing Kumud Majumder’s story of his only child, Arya, 
it would become blatantly obvious to most that something should done.  Before Arya passed that 
would have involved finding a match for him, even if it meant offering compensation to potential 
donors to increase his chances.  Unlike the broad-based element approaches and such society-
wide theories like utilitarianism, narrative bioethical theory offers an important individual-based 
approach to this and other debates.  It seems clear that under narrative bioethics, organ 
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compensation would garner great support for legalization as people’s various stories of suffering 
without any choice in the matter were further analyzed and publicized. 
  2. Law and Economics Theory 
 Another newer theory is the law & economics theory of bioethics analysis.  The law & 
economics theory applies traditional economics models to bioethics, generally favoring private, 
rather than governmental, resolution of bioethical disputes.
70
  Moreover, this theory tends to be 
more libertarian in nature, favoring authority for competent adults to make virtually any non-
coerced decisions concerning medical treatment.
71
  Once again, this tends to favor the concept of 
compensation for organ transplants.  There is certainly a strong presence of individual autonomy 
underlying this theory.  It is worth noting as well that the law and economics theory is generally 
skeptical about government’s paternalistic role in regulation for any purpose other than providing 
individuals with the ability to enter into private agreements concerning their own lives.
72
  This 
theory would then counsel in support of very little government regulation and individuals 
brokering deals largely separate from any outside interference, a complete shift from the current 
state of affairs   
 The main point is clear in both theories.  Compensation for organ donations fits snugly 
within the frameworks of each.  Also, there is a strong argument to be made that organ 
compensation is called for under the more traditional utilitarianism theory of analysis.  The long-
standing principle of autonomy rests at the core of almost any argument for compensation.  It is 
explicit that organ commodification garners great support from several bioethical philosophies.   
IV. Compensatory Approaches Abroad and their Immediate Successes 
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   It is very plausible that the peripheral blood stem cell market will offer an expansive 
illustration at what organ markets could look like if compensation were legalized in the United 
States.  However, other countries have already experimented with various forms of organ 
compensation.  These also provide glimpses of legalized compensation.  The most prominent 
example would be Iran.  However, Saudi Arabia and Israel both have offered various forms of 
compensation more recently.   
 A. Iran 
 Iran is unique in that it has in place a government regulated compensatory program for 
living kidney donors.  This program originated in 1988 and is carried out under the authority of 
an organization known as the Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (“DATPA”).73  Once 
suitability is determined, transplants are performed in state-authorized hospitals and funded by 
the government.
74
  The transplant surgeons have no input in selecting a donor nor do they receive 
any extra benefits from the procedure.
75
  This serves to eliminate conflicts of interest for the 
physicians.  Potential donors are also not permitted to contact anyone on the waiting list.
76
   
 The donor receives compensation equal to US$1200 following donation from the State.
77
  
However, compensation for the donor is not limited to this fixed amount.  Donors always meet 
the recipient prior to the operation.
78
  It is at this time when donor and recipient are able to 
negotiate other payments with the support of DATPA.
79
  For those recipients too poor to pay the 
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donor, DATPA seeks support from charitable organizations to cover costs.
80
  Donors are also 
provided one year of free healthcare afterwards.
81
  
  1. Success of the Program 
 By most accounts, the Iranian program from compensation has been very successful.  
Iran claimed to have eliminated its renal transplant waiting list by 1999, just eleven years after 
the program’s implementation.82  This could be partially explained however by a much more 
limited access to dialysis in Iran as opposed to other countries.
83
  Nevertheless, it should not 
overshadow the strides Iran’s program has made.  By the end of 2005, 19,609 renal transplants 
were performed in Iran and a staggering 15,356 of them were from living-unrelated donors.
84
  
This compensatory model did not prohibit Iran from developing a deceased-donor organ 
transplantation program either (which was not in existence before the compensatory model was 
established).
85
  There is also some consensus that the launching of Iran’s program halted many 
illegal and commercial renal transplants.
86
  Previously, many Iranian patients without a living 
related donor would travel to India or Europe to receive transplants.
87
  This contributed greatly to 
the spread of Hepatitis, among other diseases.
88
  Success can also be seen in Iran’s place on the 
global rankings of living kidney donation rates.  Following the legalizing of compensation, Iran 
immediately jumped up to third overall on this list.
89
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  2. Motivations of the Donors 
 Due to the success of Iran’s program the motivations of these living unrelated donors are 
important to examine.  Undoubtedly, compensation was important to the donors.  In one study, 
37.3% stated their motivation for donation was solely financial, but almost 61% offered a mix of 
compensation and altruistic intentions as their incentive.
90
  Prior to their discharge from the 
hospital, 86.5% of donors reported complete satisfaction with their decision.
91
  Three-quarters of 
the donors wanted to be informed of the outcome.
92
  Additionally, two-thirds of the donors were 
willing to make some sort of connection with the recipient following the transplantation.
93
  
Compensation was not always the sole factor in donors’ decisions, but the supply was certainly 
increased by those for which it was the single reward.  It could also easily be presumed that 
compensation was the tipping point for at least some portion of the 61% who had mixed 
motivations to donate.    
 B. Saudi Arabia 
 Other countries have adopted similar compensatory approaches as Iran, including Saudi 
Arabia.  Saudi Arabia passed a law in 2007, which allowed the government to offer payment for 
organ donations.
94
  The government offers substantial compensation in the form of 50,000 riyals, 
which is equivalent to roughly US$13,000 as well as other benefits such as life-time medical 
care.
95
  It was believed that this program would similarly curb illegal and transplant tourism for 
Saudi citizens.
96
  Success of the new Saudi Arabian program is illustrated by its quadrupling of 
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the country’s prior living kidney donor rate.97  This catapulted Saudi Arabia to number one on 
the global rankings of living kidney donations.
98
 
 C. Israel 
 Israel has placed greater focus on increasing organ donors in recent years as well.  
Recently enacted legislation passed by the Knesset allowed for the State to provide live donors 
with a fixed financial compensation package.
99
  The package was determined by the Health 
Ministry and intended to largely compensate for lost earning potential due to surgery as well as 
recuperation.
100
  The compensation includes a fixed sum of approximately US$5,500, free health 
insurance for several years afterwards, the cost of the surgery, and psychiatric treatment.
101
  
Living donors did not begin to receive these benefits, including the financial compensation until 
August 2010, though.
102
  In 2011, Israel had 117 kidney transplants from living donors, which 
was an astonishing 64% more than it had the previous year.
103
  Many believed that the newly 
enacted financial compensation package was responsible for this marked increase.
104
 
V. Compensation for Organ Donation should be legalized within the United States 
 A. Remuneration would Alleviate the Supply Problem 
 NOTA has been in effect in the U.S. for almost three decades.  Therefore, the U.S. has a 
lengthy snapshot of what total prohibition for organ compensation entails.  By most statistics, the 
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situation is only growing grimmer.  The number of living donors has progressively declined over 
the past five years.
105
  As Andrew Klein, M.D. and Director of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center’s 
Comprehensive Transplant Center put it, “this decline has resulted in a widening gap between 
the number of organs available for transplant, and the number of patients who are awaiting a 
donor organ.”106  He aptly added, “Ironically, the single largest factor in today’s donor organ 
shortfall is that solid organ transplants have become so successful.”107  In other words, organ 
transplantation technology has rapidly increased the success of operations and the duration of life 
enjoyed by recipients afterwards, but supply has not kept up.   
 As the total of people on transplant waiting lists dramatically increases over time, the 
percentage of them able to receive a new organ largely decreases.  Some estimates show that 
only 20 percent of those in need for a kidney transplant receive the necessary operation.
108
  This 
percentage is a marked decrease from the early 1990s when almost 50 percent of those on the 
waiting list would receive at least one operation.
109
  Using 1996 as a baseline, patients who were 
waitlisted for kidneys in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 were respectively 15%, 27%, 37%, and 
42% less likely to receive the necessary transplant.
110
  Recently, even deceased donor 
transplantation rates have been declining.
111
  Organs from deceased donors decreased in 2008 for 
the first time.
112
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 The issue is no secret; it is merely one of supply.  As a result, thousands continue to die 
each year awaiting their chance at a match from an unsatisfactory number of donors.  From 
January to October of 2009, 3,363 Americans died while waiting for a kidney transplant.
113
  
During the same period, 1,154 more died waiting for a new liver.
114
  In those countries which 
have adopted compensatory programs supply has been alleviated to some extent, often with 
immediately evident progress.  Legalizing compensation for body parts presently prohibited 
under NOTA would best increase the supply to meet patient demands.  Subsequently, this would 
offer the greatest opportunity to maximize the number of donor matches.  
 B. The Human Body is already Commodified 
  The Flynn decision re-raised the issue of precisely which materials are prohibited from 
compensation and why.  The anti-organ commodification side has often asserted that the sale of 
human body parts is morally repugnant.  Representative Waxman’s statement that human body 
parts should not be akin to fenders in an auto junkyard essentially conveyed this sentiment as 
much.  However, NOTA explicitly excluded certain bodily materials from its scope, such as 
blood and blood derivatives.
115
  It also excluded replenishable tissues such as sperm and eggs.
116
  
 All of these materials are sold within the United States today.  People are paid for blood, 
sperm, and egg donations regularly.  With the addition of the Flynn decision, people can now be 
compensated for what are more commonly known as bone marrow donations too.  It is still 
difficult to discern why sale of these materials is not considered morally repugnant in the same 
manner as kidneys or livers.  Moreover, the replenishable aspect of such tissues does not seem to 
be important since liver transplants normally involve the donor’s liver re-growing the portion 
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that was donated.
117
  It appears that the prohibition is broadly intended to stop compensation for 
solid organs while allowing it for bodily fluids.  The question remains however as to why such a 
distinction exists.  The antiquated arguments of being morally reprehensible and of 
replenishability hold even less weight now than they maybe once did.  
 Not only have these arguments lost some of their luster, but questions of fundamental 
fairness continue to persist.  The aforementioned kidney transplant hypothetical based upon the 
Stanford University study served to demonstrate how the lines between what could be 
compensated and what could not have become even more nuanced.  Following from the Flynn 
holding, an individual suffering from leukemia most likely will have a better chance at finding a 
match since supply of bone marrow donations should increase due to compensation.  
Alternatively, an individual suffering from end stage renal disease will still have the same 
increasingly long-shot odds at receiving a kidney transplant.  This is because the supply of 
kidneys will remain stagnant without compensation as the waiting list likely grows.  A 
fundamental sense of fairness would impel that supply of donors not be limited for some simply 
because of what particular part of their body is afflicted, at least in lieu of a more convincing 
reason than moral reprehensibility.            
 C. Curtailment of the Black Market & Transplant Tourism 
 By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, 
American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ.  For example, 
Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign 
patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.
118
  If 
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demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major 
hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure.  Statistical information is 
difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a 
substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically.  
As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs 
succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119  The 
black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients.  Rather, it is driven 
upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire 
what they need domestically.
120
  One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as 
twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.
121
  Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. 
Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when 
he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants 
to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable?  If it is done safely, the donor 
will not suffer.”122  Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that 
he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.
123
  The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal 
deficiency.
124
  Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest 
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going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.
125
  If those American 
citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible 
that stories like this would become much less commonplace.     
 However, legal compensation could also serve to limit the domestic black market as well.  
It would prevent situations such as that of “The Kidney Guy,” recently captured by the FBI.126  
Levy Izhak Rosenbaum, a Brooklyn man with strong ties to the Orthodox Jewish community, 
pled guilty to taking cash related to acquiring human organs for transplants.
127
  Rosenbaum 
allegedly took payments of $120,000 or more for brokering various kidney deals.
128
  
Rosenbaum’s case is important because it illustrates that legalizing compensation could also cut 
off the domestic black market as well.    With the proper amount of regulation of a compensatory 
market, middle men or brokers like Rosenbaum would not need to exist. 
 The domestic black market does not just involve individual brokers like Rosenbaum, 
though.  Whether aware or not, U.S. hospitals could be aiding a domestic black market by barely 
inquiring into the source of organs for transplantation due to the lucrative payments for 
performing such operations.
129
  Donna Luebke, former board member at the United Network for 
Organ Sharing has said that many hospitals use staffers who might not look too hard for red 
flags.
130
  If the staffer is not truly independent there are said to be “too many conflicts of 
interest.”131  If some hospital staffers are in on such illegal activity, they could also be largely 
stopped by legalizing compensation and with some regulation.  Both the domestic black market 
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and transplant tourism could be significantly hampered by legalizing organ compensation in the 
United States.  The positive effects of this would once again far outweigh the negatives and more 
people would be helped rather than harmed.   
VI. Conclusion 
 The Flynn v. Holder decision was remarkable for those in need of bone marrow 
transplants.  Although the holding was expressly limited, these specific patients will be likely to 
see many more donors and thus, many more matches, in the near future.  As a market begins to 
develop compensation could easily move well beyond $3,000 in either housing subsidies or 
scholarships.
132
  Donors should then increase greatly and thus bolster further support for 
compensation of other organs.  Once fully up and running, the peripheral blood stem cell market 
could give a functional picture of what organ markets in the U.S. would look like in practice. 
 As wonderful as the Flynn decision should turn out to be, it still left roughly the same 
debate on organ commodification that existed when NOTA was enacted.  On the other hand, the 
evidence has moved drastically in the past thirty years towards compensation for organs.  Organ 
transplant technology has become incredibly successful and recipients live longer than ever.  
However, the numbers on the waiting lists only continue to skyrocket.  Meanwhile, supply drops 
continuously amongst living donors.  The deceased donor rate has also dropped.  International 
examples of compensatory systems have shown instant alleviations of the supply problem.  Saudi 
Arabia jumped to the top spot in the world’s living kidney donor rate.  Iran claims that it 
eliminated its waiting list within a decade.  Israel saw a 64% increase of living donors in the first 
year alone.   
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 No system is perfect.  The poor will always be the majority of organ sellers under any 
system.
133
  This by itself does not mean that compensation should not be allowed.  The 
distributive justice argument has demonstrably failed despite NOTA’s original intentions 
because, “health care middlemen have dramatically marked up the cost of transplant related 
services to capture much if not all of the surplus that was intended to go to the recipient.”134 
Essentially, economists have shown that organs are still being allocated on the basis of ability to 
pay today.
135
   
 Regenerative medicine may be the answer in the next decade or two when those in need 
can simply have organs grown from their own stem cells in a laboratory.
136
  This would certainly 
alleviate the supply problem and be an immeasurable success.  Unfortunately, this does nothing 
for the people presently who die every single day, unnecessarily waiting for a match.  Of course, 
supply will likely never reach one hundred percent efficiency given the size of the gap in the 
United States, but compensation for organs would certainly take the mountain and help turn it 
into a mere hill. 
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